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district court. The district court then dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction under the CWA. The United States appealed, claiming
CWAjurisdiction existed.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first examined whether the district
court correctly interpreted Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), where the Supreme Court held
that non-navigable wetlands, if adjacent to navigable water, are under
the jurisdiction of the CWA. Because Rapanos' land was proximate
but not connected to wetlands, the Sixth Circuit also relied on a
Fourth Circuit decision in United States v. Deaton. The Deaton court
determined that a small area between wetlands and navigable waters
constituted a "significant nexus" and therefore was within CWA
jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit used this holding to show that Rapanos'
land similarly had a "significant nexus" to wetlands, thus establishing
CWAjurisdiction.
Next, the court turned to a disputed jury instruction defining the
term "waters." Since Rapanos did not object to the instruction, the
court reviewed the instruction for plain error. The Sixth Circuit
determined that SWANCCs interpretation of the CWA jurisdiction
clause did not invalidate the agency's regulation upon which the
instruction was based, concluded that the district court jury could not
have based its decision on impermissible grounds, and held that
Rapanos' rights could not have been affected by the jury instruction.
Concluding the CWA applied to Rapanos' land and that the jury
instructions were sufficient, the court reversed the decision of the
district court, reinstated the conviction, and remanded the case to the
district court for sentencing.
Becky Bye

SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 335 F.3d 607 (7thCir. 2003) (holding a government agency
can enter into a coordination agreement with other regulatory
agencies for the purpose of correlating federal regulations under the
permit requirements of the Clean Water Act so long as the
coordination agreement does not increase the agencies' regulatory
authority beyond that granted by Congress).
The Home Builders Association of Greater Chicago ("Home
Builders") filed three successive complaints in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief against the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps"). The catalyst for the suits was an Interagency
Coordination Agreement ("ICA") between the Corps and various local
water-regulating agencies. Home Builders claimed adoption of the
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COURT REPORTS

ICA lacked sufficient notice and comment and impermissibly
extended the Corps authority under both the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Rivers and Harbors Act. In response to Home
Builders' fourth attempt to amend their complaint, the district court
held the claim was nonjusticiable because Home Builders had failed to
identify a concrete injury caused by the Corps. The district court thus
dismissed the action. Home Builders appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district
court's decision.
The purpose of the ICA was to coordinate federal regulation of soil
erosion and sediment flows under the permit requirements of the
CWA. The provisions of the ICA included both authorization for
consultation with specified local agencies regarding soil erosion and
sediment control plans and review of the implementation of these
plans through onsite inspections. Under the ICA, all signatories were
to remain independent. The Corps specifically retained the right to
make final decisions regarding opinions, actions, or findings within its
jurisdiction.
The controlling issue was whether the Corps' adoption of the ICA
was a final agency action within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA"). The APA permits judicial review of "final
agency actions for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court." Home Builders sought such review and claimed the Corps
used the ICA as a means to improperly leverage its regulatory authority
beyond that given by Congress.
Furthermore, Home Builders
complained the ICA would produce delays through additional
procedural hurdles and conflicting requirements. The court held that
although the provisions of the ICA included substantial discretionary
elements and represented a definitive pronouncement of Corps policy,
it only provided a procedural framework under which the Corps
operated. In support of this, the court identified express provisions of
the ICA granting the Corps the right to make final decisions.
Additionally, the court acknowledged the possibility that the ICA
would actually reduce, rather than increase, the costs and delays of the
permitting process, and held the ICA did not "impose new legal
requirements on regulated parties, or alter the legal regime to which
Home Builders' members were subject." The court concluded that as
long as the Corps did not leverage its regulatory authority using the
ICA "beyond that provided for by statute" (which the court found it
had not), entering the ICA was not a final agency action subject to
judicial review.
The court briefly addressed Home Builders' claim that the Corps
lacked statutory authority to enter into the ICA in the first place by
noting that the language of the CWA permitted such coordination
with local authorities. The appeals court then affirmed the judgment
of the district court, dismissed Home Builders' complaint, and denied
further leave to amend.
Brian M. Forbush

